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Abstract—Minimizing the risk of system failure in any computer 
structure requires identifying those components whose failure is 
likely to impact on system functionality. Clearly, the degree of 
protection or prevention required against faults is not the same 
for all components. Tolerating soft errors can be much improved 
if critical components can be identified at an early design phase 
and measures are taken to lower their criticalities at that stage. 
This improvement is achieved by presenting a criticality ranking 
(among the components) formed by combining a prediction of 
faults, consequences of them, and a propagation of errors at the 
system modeling phase; and pointing out ways to apply changes 
in the model to minimize the risk of degradation of desired 
functionalities. Case study results are given to validate the 
approach. 
Keywords-Criticality Analysis; Soft Errors; Reliability Risks, 
UML Model; Metrics 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The temporary unintended changes of states resulting from the 
latching of single-event transients (transient voltage 
fluctuations) create transient faults in a circuit and when these 
faults are executed in the system, the resultant error is defined 
as soft errors. Soft errors cannot create a physical damage to a 
chip but can be catastrophic for the desired functionalities of 
the system [1], [2]. Specifically, they are a matter of concern 
in those systems where high reliability is a necessity [3]. 
Space programs, where a system cannot malfunction while in 
flight, banking transactions, where a momentary failure may 
cause a huge difference in balances, mission critical embedded 
applications and so forth are a few examples where a soft error 
is severe. Increases in system complexity, reduction in 
operational voltages, exponential growth of the number of 
transistors per chip, increases in clock frequencies and 
shrinking of devices significantly increase the rate of soft 
errors [4], [5]. 
Prior research to cope with soft errors mostly focuses on post-
design phases such as circuit level solutions, logic level 
solutions, spatial redundancy, temporal redundancy, and/or 
error correction codes. Early detection and correction of such 
problems during the design phase is much more likely to be 
successful than detection once the system is operational [6]. 
Estimating reliability (or at least identifying failure-prone 
components) early in the life-cycle of a design is therefore 
preferable [7], [8]. Ideally, this should be at the system design 
level so that the designer can create required prevention or 
detection mechanisms in the detailed design that follows. 
From a pure dependability viewpoint, critical components 
attract more attention of protection/prevention mechanisms 
than others do since reliability of a system is correlated with 
the criticality of the system [9], [10]. Hence, an approach is 
needed at the design stage to highlight those components 
where soft errors are critical. 
This paper examines the use of metrics to identify the 
components in a system model that are soft errors critical in 
creating impacts in system functionality. It also investigates 
how to encourage the designer to explore changes that could 
be made in the existing model. For example, how the 
criticalities of top ranked (critical) components could be 
minimized or how these components could be replaced with 
alternatives, and/or with less critical components is examined. 
The objective is to keep the functionality and other constraints 
of the system unaffected or to make a trade off between them, 
with the goal to minimize the risks of soft errors. Case studies 
illustrate the effectiveness of this approach in determining 
components’ criticality rankings and then lowering their 
criticalities.  The model is expressed in Unified Modeling 
Language (UML) since this allows the modeler to describe 
different views on a system, including the physical layer. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Researchers have evolved several measures to prevent soft 
errors. Much less attention has been dedicated, until now, to 
the integration of design processes with reliability verification 
techniques. Rather, a “fix-it-later” approach is still dominant. 
At a system level, duplicating hardware [11], [12] and then 
comparing the results, and/or executing several copies of 
software by using the same hardware [13] to detect soft errors 
are the most common approaches. Then, different recovery 
approaches are employed to recover from the soft errors. At 
the circuit level, the solution is mainly to increase the critical 
charge of a circuit node [14]. Logic level solutions [5] mainly 
propose detection and recovery in combinational circuits by 
using redundant or self-checking circuits. Gold et al. [15] 
proposed distributed shared memory multi-processor features 
that incorporate computation and memory storage redundancy 
to detect and recover from a single point of transient or 
permanent failure. Mohamed et al. [16] shows chip level 
redundant threading with recovery, where the basic idea is to 
run each program twice, as two identical threads, on a 
simultaneous multithreaded processor. These post-functional 
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design phase approaches are costly as well as complex to 
implement. Moreover, they can increase time delays and 
power overhead without offering any performance gain. 
Timing and synchronizing issues are also matters of great 
concern in these approaches.  
Few approaches [17], [18] dealt with the static complexities of 
the system as a risk assessment methodology to minimize the 
risks of faults. However, these static approaches do not deal 
with the matter of how a module functions in its executing 
environment. A fault may not manifest itself into a failure if 
never executed. Cortellessa et al. [6] and Yacoub et al. [10] 
defined dynamic metrics that include dynamic complexity and 
dynamic coupling metrics to measure the quality of software 
architecture. To assess the severity of the components, they 
have defined only three levels of system failure. However, in 
real life scenarios, only three severity levels are not sufficient 
to represent several possible failure modes. 
III. A METHODOLOGY TO MEASURE AND REDUCE 
COMPONENT’S CRITICALITY 
Complexity is taken as a measure of the likelihood of a 
component to be affected by soft errors. Severity of failure of 
components is taken as a measure of the impact of a system’s 
functionality being affected by a component suffering a soft 
error. The methodology presented here is to measure the 
complexity and severity of each component, plus the 
propagation of failure from that component, and then take the 
product as a measure of criticality. The model is examined by 
refactoring to lower component criticality by maintaining 
constraints. The details of these steps are outlined as follows. 
A. Measuring the Complexities of the Components 
There is a correlation between the likelihood of soft errors 
proneness and the complexity of a system [9], [19]. Complexity 
analysis does not measure the impact of components in system 
functionality, but it shows the rank of likelihood of soft error 
proneness among the components. Complexity is measured, in 
this paper, by an assessment of Execution Time (ET) during 
simulation and Message-In-and-Out frequency (MIO). 
1) Execution Time during Simulation 
The Failure-In-Time (FIT) of a system due to soft error is 
proportional to the fraction of time in which the system is 
susceptible to soft errors if the circuit type, transistor sizes, 
node capacitances, temperature etc. are kept at constant [20]. 
The longer duration to perform the selected operation implies 
that the component is being used more frequently and/or it is 
experiencing many state changes. A soft error occurs at any 
access point and/or in any behavioral change of these 
components can spread towards all communicating 
components through the large number of behavioral linkages 
until the soft error affected component is in execution. The 
method of measuring ET during simulation (to perform an 
operation by a component) can be shown as follows. 
Component state S is a function of time: S (t) where t denotes 
time. An external function F () is required to be executed to 
perform the operation F (S (ti)) → S (tj)): where S (ti) is the 
state of a component at ti and S (tj) is the state of that 
component at tj. Hence, ET, to execute the function F () that 
changes the state of the pth component from S (ti) to S (tj), can 
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Where n is the total number of state changes in the pth 
component’s behaviour execution and dpj is the duration in the 
jth slot of changing states of pth component. Since UML does 
not specify how to simulate the architecture models, Telelogic 
Rhapsody [21] is used to gain execution data via simulation. 
The model is executed in tracing mode. Several tracing 
commands are used to execute the model. The state transition 
times for the components are saved to a log file. At the end of 
the simulation, that log file is analyzed to calculate the total ET 
of the components to perform a selected operation. 
2) Message-In-and-Out Frequency 
In a model-based system, components are often 
interdependent. They communicate with each other by message 
passing among them. Number of messages from and to a 
component shows the measure of dependence with other 
components. Components with more dependence could easily 
manifest themselves into a failure of the system because 
services of these components are frequently accessed by other 
components . To figure out this fault proneness, a component’s 
MIO, which is the ratio of number of messages from and to a 
component in a scenario and total number of messages in that 
scenario is calculated. Define 
kiMIO as the MIO for ith 
component in kth scenario. M (i,j) is the message between 
component i and component j (where j=1,….,m , ji ≠ , and m 
is the number of messages from ith component to other 
components) in kth scenario, and kn  is the total number of 
messages, communicating among all the components, in that 
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For each component, Total MIO (TMIO) in all possible 












where n ′ is the total number of scenarios in the system, 
)( kScP is the probability of kth Scenario in that system, and 
ki
MIO is the MIO for ith component in kth scenario. 
3) Overall Complexity 
The Overall Complexity of the ith Component (OCCi) is 
the summation of different complexity factors for that 
component. The equation to derive OCCi is shown in (4). 
iii TMIOETOCC +=  (4)
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where iET and iTMIO are Execution Time, and Message-
In-and-Out frequency for the ith component. Since, iET and 
iTMIO are independent on each other, OCCi is calculated using 
the summation of these two factors. For simplicity, the weights 
of ET and TMIO in measuring total value of complexities are 
assumed as equal. 
B. Measuring the Severity of the Failure of the 
Components 
A single soft error in a particular component could have a 
greater effect than multiple soft errors in another or a set of 
components. For this reason, the effects of soft errors in the 
whole system need to be analyzed by injecting transient faults 
(which will create soft errors if activated) into each component. 
These results are merged with the component’s complexities to 
obtain a better measure of their impact on system if they are 
affected by soft errors. The severity of failures of components 
is determined by the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) method [22]. FMEA is a procedure for the analysis of 
potential failure modes within a system by classifying severity 
or determination of the failure’s effect upon the system. 
Hosseini et al. [22] suggested evaluation criteria and a ranking 
system for the severity of effects for a design FMEA as shown 
in TABLE I. Transient faults are injected at each component, 
into one bit at a time. The reason is that transient faults change 
the value of one bit at a time and the probability of changing 
two bits and/or two transient faults are almost zero. 












C. Measuring Propagation of Failure from the 
Components 
Before measuring the component’s propagation of failure, 
its complexity and severity are multiplied together to measure 
there combined impact (if there is any soft error) on the whole 
system. Measuring the propagation of failure refines this 
impact to obtain a clearer picture of the impact or criticality of 
each component. The method of measuring the propagation of 
failure is shown in Fig. 1, which is a scenario of a system 
model showing three components: C1, C2, and C3. ENV denotes 
the environment communicating with the system. The product 
of complexity and severity of these three components are s1, s2, 
and s3 respectively. 
 
Fig. 1. An Example Scenario of a System Model to Measure the 
Propagation of failure  
In Fig. 1, x1,….,x10 indicate the severity in corresponding 
messages where indexing is made according to their time of 
occurrences in the whole scenario. Failures due to soft errors 
may be propagated via message communication. The 
propagation of failure from or in the environment is not 
considered. To measure propagation of failure through message 
passing involves finding the increase in the level of 
consequences of each message. A soft error in C1 (before it 
passes a second message) sees an increase in level of 
consequences in C2 to s1x2, since soft errors may propagate 
from C1 to C2 through the passed message. 
After passing the 2nd message, there is an increase in level 
of consequences in C2: s1x2 and after passing the 3rd message, 
there is an increase in level of consequences in C3: s1x2s2x3. 
Similarly, after passing the 9th message, there is an increase in 
the level of consequences in C1: 
s1x2s2x3s3x4s2x5s2(x6+x7)s1x8s1x9 
The total consequences in the system can be defined as 
11CONC  (= s1x2s2x3s3x4s2x5s2(x6+x7)s1x8s1x9) 
If the soft error occurs in C1 within the 2nd and 8th 
messages then the consequences (
21CONC  = s1x8s1x9) can be 
propagated in the system after passing the 8th message. If the 
soft error occurs in C1 after passing the 8th message then the 
consequences (
31CONC  = s1x9) can be propagated in the 
system with the 9th message. In the same way, if soft errors 
occur in C2, and/or in C3 then the increase in level of 
consequences can be checked at different stages of message 
passing. The consequences in the system can be measured as 
follows. 
12CONC  = s2x3s3x4s2x5s2(x6+x7)s1x8s1x9 
22CONC = s2x5s2(x6+x7)s1x8s1x9 
32CONC = s2(x6+x7)s1x8s1x9 
42CONC  = s2x7s1x8s1x9 
13CONC = s3x4s2x5s2(x6+x7)s1x8s1x9 
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The total propagation of failure from each component (due 
















iCONCCONC T  
133 CONCCONC T =  
If the values of s1, s2, and s3; and x1,…, x10 are known then 
the above propagations can be derived. The total propagation of 
failure in the whole system (due to a soft error in any 
component) can be shown as follows: 
where n is the total number of scenarios in the system, 
)( kScP is the probability of the kth scenario, and kiCONC is 
the propagation of failure from the ith component in the kth 
scenario. 
D. Measuring Criticalities of the Components 
 For each component, criticality is the product of complexity, 
severity, and the propagation of failure. The combined impact 
of complexity and severity is used to calculate the propagation 
of failure. Criticality is calculated by taking the product of 
complexity, severity, and the propagation of failure. If the 
criticality of the ith component is Cri then the equation to 
derive it can be shown as: 
 where, iOCC is the overall complexity of the component, 
)( iCCON  is the propagation of failure from the component, 
and )( iCSe is the severity of the component. 
)(),(, iii CSeCCONOCC are dependent on each other; i.e. for 
any increase in complexity there is a high probability that the 
severity will increase, and if the product of complexity and 
severity increases then the probability of propagation of failure 
will increase too. Hence, criticality is taken as the product of 
overall complexity, severity, and propagation of failure. 
E. Lowering the Criticalities of Components 
Component criticality suggests to the designers where in 
the system design changes are necessary or helpful to minimize 
soft errors risk. These changes can be done by applying a 
suitable approach where he/she may change the architecture or 
behavioral model of the component to lower its complexity, 
and/or severity, and/or propagation of failure. Refactoring is a 
good candidate for this type of approach. UML model 
refactoring re-structures the model, at the conceptual level, to 
improve quality factors such as maintainability, efficiency and 
fault tolerance without introducing any new behaviour [23].  
Once the criticality ranking is returned, a model can be 
refactored with the goal of reducing the criticalities of the 
components. Lowering the criticalities can be achieved by 
reducing any of the multiplying factors: complexity, severity or 
propagation of failure. 
IV. CASE STUDIES 
Real-life case study: an Automated Rail Car System illustrates 
the application of the metrics. This is a safety critical 
application, which must meet real-time criteria. It is chosen, as 
it is illustrative of a broad class of systems that must have high 
reliability. A Car has four main components: ProximitySensor, 
Cruiser, DestPanel, and OccupancySensor; and a Terminal has 
six main components: CarHandler, PlatformManager, 
CallCarButton, Entrance, Exit, and ExitManager. 
A.  ET Analysis in the Automated Rail Car System 
The state changes of the Car, which are used to measure the 
ET of the components in the Automated Rail Car System, can 
be described as follows. Calculated ET for the different 
components to take a car from Terminal [0] to Terminal [3] is 
shown in TABLE II.  
 
TABLE II.  MIO, TMIO AND OVERALL COMPLEXITIES OF ALL 










B. MIO and TMIO Analysis in the Automated Rail Car 
System 
MIO and TMIO for all components are calculated using the 
equations as shown in (2) and (3). All values of TMIO for all 
sub-systems are shown in TABLE II. The blank cells for 
TMIO in Table II indicate no message from the corresponding 
component in the corresponding scenario.  
C. Overall Complexities of the Components in the 
Automated Rail Car System 
The total complexities of all components are calculated using 
the equation as shown in (4). The last column in TABLE II 
shows the measured values of each component’s complexity. 
Their values are normalized by taking the ratio between them 
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Components Normalized 
values of ET 
TMIO OCC 
Car .933 1.14 2.073 
ProximitySensor .023 0.21 0.233 
Cruiser .0074 0.5 0.5074 
DestPanel .005 - 0.005 
OccupancySensor .004 - 0.004 
Terminal .0015 0.21 0.2115 
CarHandler .014 1.07 1.084 
CallCarButton .002 - 0.002 
Entrance .004 0.14 0.144 
Exit .0025 0.14 0.1425 
ExitManager .003 0.21 0.213 
PlatformManager .0074 0.21 0.2174 
ControlCenter .0005 - 0.0005 
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headings, ‘Overall Complexities of the Components’ is 
abbreviated as OCC in TABLE II. In the chosen model’s 
scenarios, all components’ participations are not there. Hence, 
MIO and TMIO for some components may not be measured 
for this example. Only ET is taken to measure the overall 
complexities of those components. 
D. Validating the Complexities of the Components in the 
Automated Rail Car System 
To validate the component’s complexity measurement, trials 
were conducted whereby transient faults were injected into the 
components of the selected system. The probabilities of 
occurrences of soft errors in the components are calculated by 
taking the ratios between total number of soft error 
occurrences and total number of fault injections. This ratio can 
be defined as the Error/Fault injections (E/F) Ratio. Ten trials 
were made for transient fault injection into every component. 
The more trials are performed, the better the expected result. 
However, for this large example model, it is expected that ten 
trials in each component can give a good idea about their 
probabilities of occurrences of soft errors. TABLE III shows 
the E/F rations for this example. If these rations are ranked in 
an ascending order then it is observed that TABLE II has a 
similar ranking to TABLE III until the Cruiser component. The 
next ratio is equal for ProximtySensor, PlatformManager, and 
ExitManager where, in TABLE II, their complexity values 
differ a little. If that slight difference is neglected, then the 
complexity ranking for these components shows similar 
results in these tables. 
 
TABLE III.  E/F RATIOS OF THE COMPONENTS IN AUTOMATED RAIL CAR 
SYSTEM  









ProximitySensor 4 0.4 
Cruiser 5 0.5 
DestPanel 1 0.1 
OccupancySensor 1 0.1 
Terminal 3 0.3 
CarHandler 7 0.7 
CallCarButton 1 0.1 
Entrance 3 0.3 
Exit 3 0.3 
ExitManager 4 0.4 
PlatformManager 4 0.4 
ControlCenter 1 0.1 
 
E. Measuring the Severity of Failure of the Components 
in the Automated Rail Car System Model 
Severity of the failure of the components was determined by 
the FMEA method. The severities of the failure of Car, 
ProximitySensor, Cruiser, DestPanel, OccupancySensor, 
Terminal, CarHandler, CallCarButton, Entrance, Exit, 
ExitManager, ControlCenter, and PlatformManager are 
calculated as 9, 8, 4, 1, 8, 6, 10, 1, 8, 9, 9, 1, and 6 respectively 
(ranking is based on TABLE I and the method as described in 
Section III.B). 




CICS Propagation of 
Soft Errors 
Criticality 
Car 18.657 4.1 76.4937 
ProximitySe-
nsor 1.864 10 18.64 
Cruiser 2.0296 .000000058 0.000000117717 
DestPanel 0.005 - 0.005 
OccupancyS-
ensor 0.032 - 0.032 
Terminal 1.152 .0017 0.0000000072576 
CarHandler 10.84 2.1 22.764 
CallCarButt-on 
0.002 - 0.002 
Entrance 1.152 .0000000063 0.0000000072576 
Exit 1.2825 .000014 0.000017955 
ExitManager 1.917 .0013 0.0024921 
PlatformMa-
nager 
1.3044 .0000064 0.00000834816 
ControlCent-er 
0.0005 - 0.0005 
F. Measuring Propagation of Soft Errors from the 
Components in the Automated Rail Car System 
The second column in TABLE IV shows the combined impact 
of complexity and severity. The column heading: ‘Combined 
Impact of Complexity and Severity’ is abbreviated as CICS. 
This combined impact is used to calculate the propagation of 
soft errors for both of the scenarios in this example. They are 
shown (as normalized values) in the third Column of TABLE 
IV. Since, in the chosen model’s scenarios, participation of all 
components is not considered, only the participant 
component’s soft errors propagations can be derived in this 
paper. The corresponding cells for DestPanel, 
OccupancySensor, CallCarButton, and ControlCenter are 
blank in the table since they did not participate in the scenarios.  
G. Measuring Criticalities of the Components in the 
Automated Rail Car System 
Component criticality is calculated by taking the product of 
complexity, severity, and propagation of soft errors. In the case 
of absence of propagation of soft errors, the combined impact 
of complexity and severity were deemed final criticalities. 
Component criticality is shown in the last column of TABLE 
IV. The results show that Car is the most critical component 
followed by CarHandler and ProximitySensor. 
H. Lowering the Criticalities of the Components in the 
Automated Rail Car System 
As shown in TABLE IV, Car is the most critical component 
and it has large criticality differences with the second most 
critical and other components. Hence, the first target for 
reduction of its criticality is Car. That part of the model 
dealing with Car behaviour was carefully examined to 
determine refactoring possibilities. Two states and their 
internal codes were merged to reduce the time complexity. 
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Comparison among the calculated normalized ET of the 
components of the refactored model and existing model (to 
take a car from Terminal [0] to Terminal [3]) is shown in 
TABLE V. 
 
TABLE V.  COMPARISON AMONG THE CALCULATED NORMALIZED ET OF 
THE COMPONENTS OF REFACTORED MODEL AND EXISTING  
 
 
TABLE V shows that refactoring the model lowered the ET of 
Car and ProximitySensor to a measurable extent.  Others, 
except for OccupancySensor and PlatformManager, were also 
lowered. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper develops metrics for complexity analysis that could 
be analyzed in the early system design phase based on UML 
artifacts, develops a severity assessment methodology by 
analyzing UML model simulation results, and develops the 
methodology of measuring the propagation of failures from the 
components. This paper then integrates the three different 
methods to rank the component’s criticality that highlight the 
variations of the impact of soft errors among the components. It 
then shows how possible changes can be made in the existing 
design to lower the criticalities of the components to minimize 
the risks of soft errors. In summary, the approach presented in 
this paper is effective in measuring the soft errors risks of the 
components in a system and in lowering the criticalities of 
components to minimize the risks of functional degradation.  
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Components Normalized ET of 
Refactored Model 
Normalized ET of 
Existing Model 
Car 0.899 .995 
ProximitySensor 0.00051 .0015 
Cruiser .00048 .00048 
DestPanel .00016 .00032 
OccupancySensor 0.00035 .00026 
Terminal .00013 .000096 
CarHandler .00089 .00089 
CallCarButton .000032 .00013 
Entrance 0.00022 .00026 
Exit .00016 .00016 
ExitManager .000096 .000192 
Platform Manager 0.00064 .00048 
ControlCenter .000032 .000032 
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